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We report the results of an exploratory study that examines the reactions of climate 
scientists, climate policy experts, astrophysicists, and non-experts (N = 3,367) to 
instances of disagreement within climate science and astrophysics. The study explores 
respondents’ judgments about the factors that contribute to the creation and persistence of 
those disagreements and how one should respond to disagreements among experts. We 
found that, as compared to educated non-experts, climate experts believe (i) that there is 
less disagreement within climate science about climate change, (ii) that more of the 
disagreement that does exist concerns public policy questions rather than the science 
itself, (iii) that methodological factors play less of a role in generating existing 
disagreement among experts about climate science, (iv) that fewer personal and 
institutional biases influence the nature and direction of climate science research, (v) that 
there is more agreement among scientists about which methods or theoretical 
perspectives should be used to examine and explain the relevant phenomena, (vi) that 
disagreements about climate change should not lead people to conclude that the scientific 
methods being employed today are unreliable or incapable of revealing the truth, and (vii) 
that climate science is more settled than ideological pundits would have us believe and 
settled enough to base public policy on it. In addition, we observed that the uniquely 
American political context predicted participants’ judgments about many of these factors. 
We also found that, commensurate with the greater inherent uncertainty and data lacunae 
in their field, astrophysicists working on cosmic rays were generally more willing to 
acknowledge expert disagreement, more open to the idea that a set of data can have 
multiple valid interpretations, and generally less quick to dismiss someone articulating a 
non-standard view as non-expert, than climate scientists.  
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1. Introduction 
In today’s complex societies, many policy decisions depend crucially upon expert advice 
and opinion. But experts can and do disagree, sometimes vehemently, and not all their 
disagreements are easily adjudicated. An immediate question facing policy makers, and 
in particular those involved in decisions concerning some of the greatest challenges 
facing humanity, such as environmental policy, is how to react to persistent disagreement 
among experts. A further issue concerns how to respond to the sorry corollary of 
scientific disagreements, viz., the frequent misrepresentation and misunderstanding of 
them in the media and civic society. 
 The current paper is the output of an interdisciplinary investigation, involving 
scientists and philosophers, of the ill understood, but socially and politically significant 
phenomenon of expert peer disagreement. The ultimate goal of the project is to gain a 
better understanding of the role and consequences of disagreement among scientific 
experts and its impact on policy decisions by governmental agencies and the formation of 
public opinion. We examined cases of expert scientific disagreement in a field that is 
relatively free of economic and political pressures (cosmic ray physics) and contrasted it 
with expert disagreements in a field where significant economic and political interests are 
at stake (climate science).
1
  
 Existing studies of the opinions of climate scientists (Oreskes 2004, Bray & von 
Storch 2008, Anderegg et al. 2010, Cook et al. 2013, Stenhouse et al. 2014, Cook et al. 
2016) and the general public (Nisbet & Myers 2007, Leiserowitz et al. 2010, Leiserowitz 
et al. 2012, Pew 2012, Leiserowitz et al. 2015, Pew 2016, Gallup 2017) have shown 
                                                 
 1 Cf. the online supplementary materials document that accompanies this article for a summary of 
the key disagreements among experts in cosmic ray physics. 
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significant disparities in their assessments of the extent of disagreement or consensus 
within climate science. These studies have not, however, examined the views of climate 
experts and non-experts in regard to the various personal, methodological, or institutional 
factors that these individuals think generate expert disagreement or how they think such 
disagreements should be approached. These studies also do not compare disagreements 
about climate science to disagreements in other scientific domains. Thus, the central 
questions we investigated included the following: 
(D1) In the politically charged discipline of climate science, are there significant 
differences between the opinions of climate scientists, climate policy 
experts, and non-experts regarding the extent and causes of disagreement 
within that discipline? 
(D2) Are there significant differences between the opinions of climate scientists, 
climate policy experts, and non-experts about the contributions made by 
what we call “epistemic” factors—i.e., issues that concern the quality of 
the data, reliability of available research methods, and familiar forms of 
scientific uncertainty—and “nonepistemic” factors—those that involve 
bias or ideological distortions of the ideal scientific process by outside 
influences in bringing about persistent disagreement? 
(D3) What do climate scientists, climate policy experts, and astrophysicists take 
to be the most appropriate reaction to scientific disagreements? In 
particular, (a) should persistent disagreement regarding a given theory 
decrease our confidence in that theory? And (b) does persistent 
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disagreement lead lay people to have doubts about the possibility of 
objectivity in the domain? 
(D4) What effects does scientific disagreement have on the field in question? In 
particular, are disagreements perceived as good for the health of the 
discipline itself and what effects does publicizing disagreement have on 
public trust in science? 
We examined these issues using two questionnaires. We observed significant between-
group differences in perceptions of the extent and causes of disagreement in climate 
science.  
 Our research questions and interpretations are informed by recent discussions 
within philosophy regarding disagreement between equally competent and otherwise 
equally well-informed agents—so-called ‘peer disagreements’ (Christensen 2007, 2009; 
Feldman 2009; Goldman 2009; Kelly 2005, 2010; Matheson 2014). A central issue at 
stake in cases of peer disagreement is the normative question of how someone should 
respond when she realizes that she is in such a situation, i.e., when she discovers that a 
peer disagrees with her.
2
 Of the groups we studied, all except the astrophysicists were 
disinclined to move closer to the opinion of their peers in situations of this sort. We found 
that climate scientists were significantly more steadfast than their colleagues in 
astrophysics—at least with regard to disagreements about climate science. Relatedly, we 
found that climate scientists, compared with astrophysicists working on cosmic rays, are 
more inclined to doubt that experts who disagree with the dominant theoretical 
perspectives are as well informed as they are, which suggests that climate scientists are 
less trusting of apparent experts than their counterparts in astrophysics. This should 
                                                 
 2 Cf. the supplementary materials document for additional details about the philosophical debate. 
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perhaps not be surprising given the prevalence of ideological pundits masquerading as 
climate science experts in the media and elsewhere. The inherent uncertainty and data 
lacunae in the field of cosmic rays may also explain the willingness of astrophysicists 
working on cosmic rays to show greater tolerance towards non-standard views.  
 
2. Research Materials 
In order to investigate the research questions described above, the When Experts 
Disagree project hosted workshops with astrophysicists, climate scientists, climate policy 
experts, and philosophers working on the epistemology of disagreement. At these 
workshops, we discussed our central research questions with each group and solicited 
their input on how we might investigate them in questionnaires we subsequently 
designed. On the basis of these discussions, we constructed two questionnaires, the first 
of which (Questionnaire 1) focused on descriptive questions about factors that lead to 
persistent expert disagreement. The second (Questionnaire 2) focused on normative 
questions such as the reasonability of expert disagreement and whether encounters with 
peers with whom one disagrees should make one less confident in one’s opinions. 
Questionnaire 2 also investigated the implications of persistent disagreement for public 
policy decisions, public trust in science, and assessments of the reliability of the scientific 
field in question.  
 Our goal was to construct questionnaires for each participant group that were as 
similar as possible, so that comparisons across groups would be possible. However, some 
differences in wording were necessary. These differences are noted with underlining, 
parentheses, and footnotes below. Climate scientists, climate policy experts, and the 
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comparison group we call “educated non-experts”, consisting of university students and 
alumni, were all asked about disagreement among climate science experts. Our questions 
probed participants’ judgments about climate change and climate science as a whole, as 
opposed to particular areas or issues within climate science.
3
 Astrophysicists who work 
on cosmic ray physics were asked only about disagreements within cosmic ray physics. 
The items featured in Questionnaire 1 appear in Table 1. 
 
We are interested in how climate scientists (astrophysicists) view 
disagreements about climate change (cosmic rays).
4
 
1.1 How much disagreement about climate change (cosmic ray physics) is 
there among the experts in your field?
5
 
 
When considering the scientific methods and practices of your field, 
how important do you think the following factors are in the 
creation and persistence of disagreement about climate change 
(cosmic ray physics)? 
1.2 Those involved in the disagreement are not equally well informed. 
1.3 Those involved in the disagreement begin from different starting 
points, prior assumptions, or theoretically motivated expectations. 
1.4 Those involved in the disagreement highlight or focus on different 
kinds of data as evidence. 
1.5 Those involved in the disagreement have differing views of the 
appropriate scientific method. 
1.6 The issues about which experts in my field disagree are very complex. 
1.7 The data about which experts in my field disagree involve a great deal 
of uncertainty. 
1.8 It is difficult to obtain enough of the right kind of data needed to 
resolve the disagreements that arise. 
 
                                                 
 3 Some climate experts indicated that they would have liked to have commented on different 
aspects of the climate debate in different ways. However, because many members of the general public are 
unfamiliar with different aspects of the science of climate change and because we wanted to examine 
between-group differences on the same questions, we pitched our questions in this study at a general level. 
In a subsequent study, the results of which we do not report here, we asked different participant groups 
about particular issues within the overall climate debate. 
 4 For climate policy experts, we added ‘and climate policy experts’ to ‘climate scientists.’ The 
heading for educated non-experts read “We are interested in how members of the general public view 
disagreements about climate change among climate science experts.” 
 5 Throughout both questionnaires, the phrases ‘your field’ and ‘my field’ were changed to ‘climate 
science’ for educated non-experts. 
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When considering the practices of other experts in your field, how 
important do you think the following factors are in the creation 
and persistence of disagreement about climate change (cosmic ray 
physics)? 
1.9 Those involved in the disagreement are motivated by political 
ideology to defend particular theories. 
1.10 Those involved in the disagreement are motivated by financial 
incentives to defend particular theories. 
1.11 Those involved in the disagreement defend certain theories because 
those theories represent their life’s work and they cannot bear to give 
them up. 
1.12 Those involved in the disagreement are trying to garner attention or 
make a name for themselves. 
1.13 Those involved in the disagreement are simply being stubborn, 
closed-minded, or unreasonable. 
Table 1. Elements of Questionnaire 1. 
 
The answer choices for Question 1.1 were ‘None,’ ‘Very little,’ ‘Some,’ and ‘A great 
deal.’ For purposes of analysis, these were scored as 0, 1, 2, and 3. The answer choices 
for Questions 1.2 through 1.13 were ‘Not important,’ ‘Slightly important,’ ‘Moderately 
important,’ ‘Important,’ and ‘Very important’ (scored as 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4). All 
participants were asked demographic questions about their age, sex, education, and 
ethnicity or nationality. Experts were asked to describe the nature of their training and 
expertise. 
 In light of existing public opinion research (Nisbet & Myers 2007, Leiserowitz et 
al. 2010, Leiserowitz et al. 2012, Pew 2012, Leiserowitz et al. 2015, Pew 2016, Gallup 
2017), we hypothesized that experts and lay people would make divergent judgments 
about how much disagreement there was within climate science. Given the political 
climate in the United States, we also expected that non-expert respondents in the U.S. 
would think there was more disagreement within climate science than their peers in other 
countries. Since scientific disagreements are rarely publicized except when connected to 
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ideological, political, or religious disputes, we hypothesized that the non-experts would 
think that debates about climate science were driven more by ideological, social and 
personal factors than scientists in that field do. 
 The items featured on Questionnaire 2 appear in Table 2.  
 
We are interested in how climate scientists (astrophysicists) view 
disagreements about climate change (cosmic rays). 
2.1 How much disagreement about climate change (cosmic ray physics) is 
there among the experts in your field? 
 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following claims: 
2.2 Two experts who are equally well-informed about the science of 
climate change (cosmic ray physics) might look at the same data but 
reasonably arrive at different conclusions. 
2.3 Persistent disagreement about climate change (cosmic ray physics) 
may indicate that the tools or methods scientists use to study this 
phenomenon are not sufficiently reliable. 
2.4 Persistent disagreement about climate change (cosmic ray physics) 
may mean that there is no correct theory in this domain. 
2.5 Persistent disagreement about climate change (cosmic ray physics) 
may mean that there is more than one correct theory in this domain. 
2.6 When I find that other experts who are as well-informed as I am hold 
opinions about climate change (cosmic ray physics) that are 
significantly different from my own, this sometimes leads me to 
become less confident in my own opinions.
6
 
2.7 When I encounter an expert who disagrees with the dominant 
paradigms or theoretical perspectives in my field, this usually causes 
me to wonder whether they are really as well informed as other experts 
in the field. 
2.8 The peer review process in my field is biased against publishing 
controversial hypotheses about climate change (cosmic ray physics).
7
 
2.9 Minority or dissenting perspectives on climate change (cosmic ray 
physics) are often inappropriately silenced or suppressed within my 
field.
8
 
                                                 
 6 For educated non-experts, ‘other experts’ was changed to ‘other people.’ 
 7 Educated non-experts were given “The peer review process in climate science is probably biased 
against publishing controversial hypotheses about climate change.” 
 8 Educated non-experts were given “Minority or dissenting perspectives on climate change are 
probably often inappropriately silenced or suppressed within climate science.” 
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2.10 Disagreements about issues such as climate change (cosmic ray 
physics) can be good for the health of my field. 
2.11 When experts in my field disagree about climate change, it is most 
often about which public policy recommendations should be made in 
light of the science rather than about the science itself. 
2.12 Publicizing the extent of disagreement among experts in my field 
reduces public trust in science. 
2.13 Scientific experts should present their science to the general public 
without making any policy recommendations about what society 
should do in light of the science. 
2.14 The science of climate change is settled enough to base public policy 
on it. 
2.15 How much trust do you have in climate science experts? 
2.16 How much trust do you have in scientists working in other areas of 
science, e.g. astrophysics? 
Table 2. Elements of Questionnaire 2. 
 
 Question 2.1 was identical to Question 1.1, so that we could compare participants’ 
answers to other questions with their answers to this particular question on both 
questionnaires. The response choices for Questions 2.2 through 2.14 were ‘Completely 
disagree,’ ‘Mostly disagree,’ ‘Slightly disagree,’ ‘Neither agree nor disagree,’ ‘Slightly 
agree,’ ‘Mostly agree,’ and ‘Completely agree’ (scored as 1 through 7). Questions 2.11 
and 2.14 were not used in the version of Questionnaire 2 that was given to astrophysicists 
because there is not a visible public policy debate concerning cosmic ray physics. 
Questions 2.15 and 2.16 were presented only to educated non-experts. Answer choices 
for these questions were ‘None,’ ‘Very little,’ ‘Some,’ and ‘A great deal’ (scored as 0 
through 3). All participants were asked the same demographic questions as in 
Questionnaire 1. 
 We hypothesized that, on the basis of scientists’ experience with ambiguous data, 
interpretive flexibility, and professional disagreements within their disciplines, scientists 
would give higher estimates than non-experts of how reasonable it can be for scientists to 
10 
10 
 
 
draw different conclusions from the same data set (Q2.2). We also tentatively 
hypothesized that scientists would be more circumspect or self-reflective when 
confronted with an equally informed but divergent opinion than non-experts (Q2.6 & 
Q2.7).  
 In the domain of morality, a number of philosophers (e.g., Ayer, 1936, Stevenson 
1944) have argued that there are no correct answers to questions about what is morally 
right or wrong on the grounds that there is no objective way to resolve disagreements that 
arise concerning them. We hypothesized that persistent disagreement in climate science 
would lead lay people to have similar doubts about whether there are objective facts in 
this domain, or, at a minimum, whether they doubt that current scientific methods are 
capable of giving us knowledge of those facts (Q2.3, Q2.4 & Q2.5).  
 We hypothesized that educated non-experts would suspect that there was a greater 
degree of inappropriate silencing within academic and scientific institutions than 
scientists would (Q2.8 & Q2.9). We hypothesized that climate scientists would be more 
likely than non-experts to respond that the disagreements surrounding climate science did 
not actually fall within the science itself but rather lay in political debates about what to 
do in light of the science (Q2.11). We hypothesized that both experts and lay people 
would think that public discussions about the extent of disagreement within climate 
science have had a negative effect on public trust in science (Q2.13). Relatedly, we 
hypothesized that non-experts would express greater confidence in the results, methods, 
and authority of scientists working in other areas than of those working in climate science 
(Q2.15 & Q2.16). 
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3. Participants 
We recruited a total of 3,367 participants for our study from January to April, 2017. 
Participants were invited to complete either Questionnaire 1 or Questionnaire 2, which 
were made available online. Climate scientists, climate policy experts, and astrophysicists 
were recruited via professional listservs and newsletters. Undergraduates at University 
College Dublin and alumni from the State University of New York at Buffalo were 
invited via email to participate in our study.
9
 23% of climate scientists reported having 
expertise in atmospheric science (e.g., meteorology, atmospheric physics), 44% in one of 
the earth sciences (incl. oceanography, glaciology, geology, hydrology), 44% in 
biological science (primarily ecology), and 5% in other sciences.
10
 Climate policy experts 
had expertise in economics, law, political science, anthropology, resource management, 
conservation, agriculture, and philosophy.  
 
  
                                                 
 9 Additional information about participant recruitment and demographics can be found in the 
online supplementary materials document that accompanies this article. 
 10 These percentages sum to more than 100% because several scientists indicated expertise in more 
than one of our areas of classification. 
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4. Results 
4.1 Summary 
The mean responses of the five participant groups to each of the items in Questionnaires 
1 and 2 are summarized below in Tables 3 and 4.
11
 For ease of reference, the rightmost 
column indicates the midpoint of the response scale for each item.  
 
Question 
Climate 
scientists 
Climate 
policy 
experts 
Under-
graduates 
Alumni 
Astro-
physicists 
Midpoint 
Q1.1     1.2     1.4     1.7     1.6     2.0 1.5 
Q1.2     2.3     2.4     3.0     3.0     1.8 2 
Q1.3     2.6     2.9     2.9     3.0     2.9 2 
Q1.4     2.6     2.3     3.0     3.0     2.5 2 
Q1.5     2.0     2.0     2.4     2.5     2.0 2 
Q1.6     2.4     2.4     2.1     2.6     2.9 2 
Q1.7     2.3     2.7     2.3     2.3     2.6 2 
Q1.8     2.1     2.3     2.3     2.2     3.0 2 
Q1.9     2.5     2.7     3.1     3.3     0.9 2 
Q1.10     2.1     2.0     3.2     3.2     1.2 2 
Q1.11     1.9     2.2     2.6     2.6     2.3 2 
Q1.12     1.7     1.7     1.8     2.0     1.9 2 
Q1.13     1.7     1.5     2.0     2.1     1.4 2 
Table 3. Mean responses of the five participant groups to each of the items 
in Questionnaire 1, along with an additional column indicating the 
midpoint of the relevant response scale. 
 
  
                                                 
 11 Additional information about these statistics can be found in the supplementary materials 
document. 
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Question 
Climate 
scientists 
Climate 
policy 
experts 
Under-
graduates 
Alumni 
Astro-
physicists 
Midpoint 
Q2.1     1.0     1.5     1.8     1.6     2.0 1.5 
Q2.2     3.6     4.1     4.6     4.6     4.8 4 
Q2.3     3.1     3.5     4.0     4.0     4.8 4 
Q2.4     2.3     2.7     2.9     3.2     4.3 4 
Q2.5     3.3     3.7     4.6     4.2     4.1 4 
Q2.6     3.6     3.2     3.5     2.9     4.5 4 
Q2.7     5.0     5.0     4.7     4.8     4.1 4 
Q2.8     3.1     3.7     4.4     3.8     4.0 4 
Q2.9     2.7     3.4     4.2     3.8     3.2 4 
Q2.10     4.5     4.5     4.4     4.8     5.5 4 
Q2.11     5.1     5.2     4.8     4.8     n/a 4 
Q2.12     4.6     4.2     4.8     4.1     3.6 4 
Q2.13     3.6     3.1     3.4     3.6     3.7 4 
Q2.14     6.0     5.8     5.2     4.8     n/a 4 
Q2.15     n/a     n/a     2.6     2.5     n/a 1.5 
Q2.16     n/a     n/a     2.7     2.7     n/a 1.5 
Table 4. Mean responses of the five participant groups to each of the items 
in Questionnaire 2, along with an additional column indicating the 
midpoint of the relevant response scale. 
 
4.2 Disagreement 
Questions 1.1 and 2.1 asked participants about the extent to which there is disagreement 
among experts about climate change or cosmic ray physics. Significant between-group 
differences were observed (cf. Figure 1).
12
 Post-hoc tests performed on the answers of 
different pairs of participant groups indicated significant differences in every case, with 
the largest differences occurring between the answers of climate scientists and 
undergraduates (r = .37), climate scientists and alumni (r = .23), and climate scientists 
                                                 
 12 Kruskal-Wallis tests were used on each question to examine overall between-group differences. 
Pairwise differences were then examined with post-hoc Mann-Whitney tests. Cf. the supplementary 
materials document for further details concerning these tests. 
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and astrophysicists (r = .44).
13
 The mean response of climate scientists fell significantly 
below the midpoint of 1.5 (r = .46), whereas those of undergraduates (r = .28), alumni (r 
= .11), and astrophysicists (r = .66) fell significantly above the midpoint. The mean 
response of climate policy experts did not differ significantly from the midpoint.  
 
 
Figure 1. Mean responses to Questions 1.1 and 2.1 (combined), organized 
by participant group. Error bars in all figures represent 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
 Many climate scientists indicated expertise in more than one of the following 
three broad categories: atmospheric science, earth science, and ecology. Focusing only on 
the 79% of climate scientists whose expertise fell squarely within only one of these 
                                                 
 13 Although perhaps most well-known as a measure of correlation, r can be calculated as a 
measure of effect size for a variety of statistical tests.  
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categories, we observed significant between-group differences in how participants 
responded to Questions 1.1 and 2.1 (cf. Figure 2).
14
 Post-hoc pairwise tests found 
significant differences between the responses of atmospheric scientists and ecologists (r = 
.25) and between earth scientists and ecologists (r = .17). Thus, within our sample of 
climate scientists, the closer a scientist’s area of expertise was to what is considered to be 
the core of climate science, the greater the level of disagreement that scientist was likely 
to report there being within that field.  
 
 
Figure 2. Mean responses to Questions 1.1 and 2.1 (combined) of those 
climate scientists whose areas of expertise falls into a single broad 
category.  
 
                                                 
 14 Kruskal-Wallis: H(2) = 17.48, p < .001. One-sample t-tests reveal that the mean response of 
atmospheric scientists did not differ significantly from the neutral midpoint of 1.5, whereas those of earth 
scientists (r = .42) and ecologists (r = .64) fell significantly below it. 
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 One possible explanation of this interesting finding is that different aspects of the 
climate debate are salient to scientists from different disciplines and that these differences 
shaped their responses to our question. For example, a marine biologist who knows that 
rising global temperatures bring stress to the ecosystems she studies may focus on the 
fact that climate scientists do not disagree at all about whether the planet is warming. 
However, an atmospheric physicist participating in our study who works on ‘climate 
sensitivity’—i.e., the question of how much global surface temperatures would rise given 
a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide—may respond to our question in light of the 
fact that different models of climate sensitivity yield different estimates.  
 It is widely noted that the debate about climate change in the United States is 
markedly different than in other parts of the world. In order to see whether our data 
reflected this difference, we sorted our participants (excluding astrophysicists) into the 
categories of expert (if they were climate scientists or climate policy experts) vs. non-
expert and American vs. non-American. A two-way ANOVA revealed significant main 
effects for being an expert and being American and a significant interaction between the 
two variables.
15
 In other words, being an American was a significant predictor of how 
participants answered Questions 1.1 and 2.1, but its predictive strength was greatest 
among the experts in our study. 
 
                                                 
 15 Expertise: F(1, 3225) = 172.68, p < .00001. Being American: F(1, 3225) = 47.21, p < .00001. 
Expertise * being American: F(1, 3225) = 9.21, p < .01. 
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Figure 3. Mean responses to Questions 1.1 and 2.1 (combined), organized 
by whether or not participants are experts or American. 
 
 Participants’ responses to Questions 1.1 and 2.1 may be shaped by the particular 
ways in which alleged disagreements within climate science are often leveraged for 
political ends, especially within the American context. Since experts in the U.S. know 
that any indication of disagreement or uncertainty about climate change that might appear 
in their responses could be used or even distorted by climate skeptics, they may feel 
pressure to downplay the extent of disagreement that they know exists. Another 
possibility is that different aspects of the climate debate may be salient to participants 
from different countries. In the U.S., admitting the very basic fact that the planet is 
warming is viewed as a strongly liberal stance. In other contexts where everyone agrees 
that the planet is warming, a question about the extent of disagreement within climate 
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science may bring to mind other issues or questions, some of which may involve more 
uncertainty or disagreement than the basic question of increasing average temperature.  
 As compared to educated non-experts, climate experts more strongly agreed on 
Question 2.11 that disagreement within climate science concerned the public policy 
recommendations that should be made in light of the science rather than the science itself. 
However, the differences were not as large as the results from Questions 1.1 and 2.1 led 
us to expect. A two-way ANOVA performed on the responses of all participants except 
astrophysicists revealed small but statistically significant main effects for the variables of 
being a climate expert and being an American, and there was a significant interaction 
between being an expert and being an American.
16
 American climate experts (M = 5.4) 
more strongly agreed that disagreements about climate change were most often about 
public policy questions than about core scientific questions than American non-experts 
(M = 4.8), non-American climate experts (M = 4.9), or non-American non-experts (M = 
4.8).  
 
4.3 Epistemic Factors 
Questions 1.2 through 1.8 asked participants how important they thought various 
epistemic factors, as defined above, were to the emergence and persistence of 
disagreement about climate change or cosmic ray physics. The first half of these 
questions concerned the behaviors or attitudes of individual experts who are involved in 
scientific disagreements. The remaining questions in this section concerned the 
phenomena studied by scientific experts—e.g., their complexity, uncertainty in the data, 
                                                 
 16 Expertise: F(1, 1643) = 11.74, p < .001. Being American: F(1, 1643) = 5.27, p = .022. Expertise 
* being American: F(1, 1643) = 8.43, p < .01. 
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and how difficult it is to obtain the right kind of data. On the whole, climate scientists and 
climate policy experts rated the epistemic factors as being less important contributors to 
expert disagreement than non-experts did.  
 Participants’ ratings of the importance of the epistemic factors represented in 
Questions 1.2 through 1.5 positively correlated with one another to a noteworthy extent 
(r’s .23 to .46, all p’s < .000001), and their ratings of the factors in 1.6 through 1.8 
correlated even more strongly (r’s .37 to .64, all p’s < .000001). Correlations between 
factors from the two groups correlated less strongly or failed to correlate significantly at 
all. Participants’ ratings on Questions 1.4 through 1.8 also significantly predicted how 
much disagreement they thought there was within climate science or cosmic ray physics 
(r’s .18 to .36, all p’s < .000001). 
 There were no significant differences between the responses of the two groups of 
climate experts on any of these questions and the two groups of non-experts were 
generally in agreement about them. Importantly, the responses of climate experts in 
general differed from those of non-experts.  
 Post-hoc comparisons between climate scientists and astrophysicists revealed 
significant differences in their responses to Questions 1.2, 1.6, and 1.8 (r’s = .16, .15, 
.25), with astrophysicists being less likely to think that disagreements in their field were 
due to some of the experts being less well-informed and more likely to think that the 
issues about which experts disagree are very complex and that it is difficult to obtain 
enough of the right kind of data needed to resolve disagreements. In regard to the other 
epistemic factors, climate scientists and astrophysicists gave largely similar responses. 
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Experts in both fields indicated that there is agreement among experts about the methods, 
theoretical frameworks, and data that are needed to address the phenomena they study.  
 One reason the of climate experts to Question 1.2 fell significantly below those of 
educated non-experts may be that the general public is frequently exposed to poorly 
informed ‘experts’ through popular media—pundits who are in fact not climate scientists 
and thus not part of the community of scientists with which climate scientists would be 
having a scientific discussion. Hence, what gets perceived as expert disagreement by the 
public may not be taken as disagreement among genuine experts by those working within 
the field. 
 In response to Questions 1.3, 1.4, and 1.5, climate scientists and climate policy 
experts gave lower ratings of the extent to which expert disagreement within climate 
science was due to different starting points, focusing on different kinds of data, or 
differing views about the appropriate methods to use than did undergraduates or alumni.  
 Comparing the responses of experts and non-experts to Questions 1.2 through 1.5 
to their responses to Questions 1.6 through 1.8, we see that both experts and non-experts 
largely agree that climate science involves uncertainties, deals with complex phenomena, 
and faces difficulties in obtaining the right kind of data. However, experts think that there 
is more theoretical or methodological agreement within their fields about how these 
epistemic fallibilities should be addressed or approached than non-experts do. Cosmic ray 
physicists gave largely similar answers to climate experts, except that the former rated the 
complexity of the phenomena they study and the difficulty of obtaining enough of the 
right kind of data about them as more important contributors to scientific disagreement. 
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4.4 Nonepistemic Factors 
Items in the second half of Questionnaire 1 examined participants’ judgments about the 
extent to which disagreements about climate change and cosmic ray physics are nurtured 
by political ideology (Q1.9), financial incentives (Q1.10), professional stake (Q1.11), 
careerism (Q1.12), or the psychological factor of stubbornness (Q1.13). The opinions of 
the non-experts paint a more negative picture of the state of climate science than those of 
practitioners within the field. 
 Participants’ ratings of the importance of the nonepistemic factors represented in 
Questions 1.9 through 1.13 all strongly correlated with one another (r’s .30 to .70, all p’s 
< .000001). There were no significant differences between climate scientists and climate 
policy experts on any of the nonepistemic questions, and undergraduates and alumni 
differed slightly on only one question. By contrast, the responses of climate experts 
differed significantly from educated non-experts on almost all questions (r’s .09 to .38). 
The responses of astrophysicists differed significantly from those of all groups on 
Questions 1.9 and 1.10 (r’s .24 to .54) but exhibited fewer differences on the other 
questions. 
 The responses of scientific experts to Question 1.9 and 1.10 differed sharply from 
those of the educated non-experts, with the latter giving substantially higher ratings of the 
importance of these factors. All participant groups largely agreed that trying to make a 
name for oneself (Q1.12) and stubbornness, closed-mindedness, and unreasonableness 
(Q1.13) were considerably less significant nonepistemic factors. 
 For each participant, we averaged together their response to each question about 
epistemic factors (Q1.2 – Q1.8) and their response to each nonepistemic question (Q1.9 – 
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Q1.13), resulting in a composite epistemic score and a composite nonepistemic score. 
Mean composite scores for each group are represented in Figure 4. A two-way mixed 
ANOVA revealed significant main effects for participant group and composite score type 
(epistemic vs. nonepistemic), along with a significant interaction between group and 
score type.
17
 In other words, (i) for a given composite score type, the scores of the groups 
differed significantly, (ii) for a given participant group, there were significant differences 
between their epistemic and nonepistemic scores, and (iii) the extent to which a 
participant group’s epistemic and nonepistemic scores differed varied across groups.  
 
 
Figure 4. Mean composite scores for questions about epistemic and 
nonepistemic factors on Questionnaire 1, organized by participant group. 
 
                                                 
 17 Group: F(4, 1624) = 38.59, p < .00001. Score type: F(1, 1624) = 83.14, p < .00001. Group * 
score type: F(4, 1624) = 15.90, p < .00001. 
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 The epistemic and nonepistemic composite scores were nearly identical for both 
undergraduates and alumni. In contrast, each of the three groups of experts gave lower 
ratings of the importance of nonepistemic. Notably, climate experts’ estimates of the 
importance of nonepistemic factors were a good bit higher than those of astrophysicists.  
 We grouped all participants except astrophysicists into the categories of climate 
expert vs. non-expert and American vs. non-American and performed two two-way 
ANOVAs on participants’ composite epistemic scores and their composite nonepistemic 
scores. With participants’ composite epistemic scores, there was a significant main effect 
for being a climate expert and a significant interaction between being an expert and being 
an American.
18
 The latter result was due to the fact that the largest pairwise differences 
on composite epistemic scores were observed between American experts and American 
non-experts. On participants’ composite nonepistemic scores, there was only a significant 
main effect for being an expert.
19
 On the whole, then, non-experts gave significantly 
higher ratings of the importance of both epistemic and nonepistemic factors in creating 
expert disagreement, and large differences were observed between experts and non-
experts concerning non-epistemic factors such as political ideology, financial incentives, 
biases, and the need to defend one’s life’s work.  
 We believe that educated non-experts’ ratings of the importance of nonepistemic 
factors indicates a significant lack of trust in professional scientists. In many studies of 
public trust in science (e.g., Pew 2015), members of the general public often indicate a 
lack of trust in particular scientific findings or in the ability of scientists to understand 
certain phenomena (e.g., health). One can get the impression that it is perhaps the 
                                                 
 18 Expert: F(1, 1573) = 33.02, p < .000001. Expert * American: F(1, 1573) = 5.77, p = .016. 
 19 F(1, 1573) = 87.18, p < .000001. 
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scientific method that they distrust. However, at least in our data, the lack of trust that 
educated non-experts display is more strongly directed more toward individuals working 
within scientific institutions (as represented by participants’ composite nonepistemic 
scores) than toward the methods employed by those scientists (as represented by their 
composite epistemic scores). 
 
4.5 Normative Issues I: The Epistemology of Disagreement 
We turn now to data from Questionnaire 2 that concern normative epistemological issues 
such as whether it can be reasonable to draw different conclusions from the same data 
(Q2.2), whether participants decrease their confidence when faced with an equally well-
informed person who disagrees with them (Q2.6), and whether participants conclude that 
someone with an atypical view is not actually as well informed as those with more 
standard views (Q2.7). Participants’ responses to Questions 2.2, 2.6, and 2.7 were 
significantly correlated. Participants who took a more permissive stance toward evidence 
(Q2.2)—by indicating that two equally well-informed experts might look at the same data 
but reasonably arrive at different conclusions—were significantly more likely to take a 
conciliationist stance toward peer disagreement (Q2.6) (r = .18, p < .000001) and 
significantly less likely to judge that someone with a divergent opinion was not actually 
well-informed (Q2.7) (r = -.20, p < .000001). Participants who adopted a conciliationist 
attitude (Q2.6) were significantly less likely to judge that people holding divergent 
opinions were not well-informed (Q2.7) (r = -.06, p = .02).  
 On Question 2.2, the responses of climate scientists differed significantly from 
those of every other group (r’s .14 to .26), with climate scientists being more likely to 
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deny there is more than one uniquely reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from a set 
of data. The responses of undergraduates, alumni, and astrophysicists did not differ 
significantly among themselves. Note that climate scientists were asked only about the 
science of climate change, so that it is possible that they might well adopt a more 
permissive approach to scientific evidence in other, less politicized domains. 
 On Question 2.6, the mean responses of climate scientists, climate policy experts, 
undergraduates, and alumni all fell significantly below the midpoint, indicating a 
disinclination to modify their views in light of contrary opinions. By contrast, 
astrophysicists were significantly inclined to modify their views upon learning about 
other experts who disagreed with them. Again, these data do not indicate that climate 
scientists and non-experts endorse a steadfast approach to peer disagreement across the 
board, since they might well adopt a more conciliationist approach in less politicized 
areas of science or everyday life. On Question 2.7, the mean responses of all four 
participant groups who were asked about climate change fell significantly above the 
midpoint, indicating a significant tendency to think that someone out of step with the 
mainstream was not really a well-informed expert after all. The mean response of 
astrophysicists did not differ from the midpoint.  
 
4.6 Normative Issues II: Objectivity 
Questions 2.3 through 2.5 probed participants’ judgments about the ways in which expert 
disagreement might underwrite the conclusion that there is a lack of epistemological or 
metaphysical objectivity within the disputed domain. Participant groups were 
significantly divided on these questions. All pairwise post-hoc comparisons on Question 
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2.3 were significant (r’s .09 to .34), except for that between undergraduates and alumni. 
The mean responses of climate scientists, climate policy experts, undergraduates, and 
alumni all fell significantly below the midpoint on Question 2.4 (r’s .36 to .74), but there 
were important differences regarding how far below the midpoint these scores fell. The 
mean response of climate scientists to this question was their lowest on Questionnaire 2. 
In response to Question 2.5, the mean responses of undergraduates and alumni fell 
significantly above the midpoint, while that of climate scientists fell significantly above. 
Thus, climate scientists and climate policy experts strongly rejected the idea that the often 
exaggerated and politicized disagreements that exist should lead people to skeptical 
conclusions about whether there are objective facts about the nature of climate change, 
whether those facts can be known, and whether current scientific methods are equal to the 
task of uncovering them.  
 
4.7 Institutional Issues 
Questions 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10 examined participants’ judgments about institutional biases 
and the benefits of expert disagreement. The responses of climate scientists differed 
significantly from those of every other group (r’s .16 to .79) on Questions 2.8 and 2.9. 
That is, climate experts indicated that they did not think the professional debate about 
climate change, as represented in academic journals and other venues, involved 
significant bias against minority views, with climate scientists expressing this opinion 
more strongly than climate policy experts. Undergraduates suspected to a certain degree 
that institutional bias was present, and alumni seemed uncertain about whether or not this 
was the case.  
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 When we put the data from Questions 2.8 and 2.9 together with the data from the 
questions about nonepistemic factors in Section 4.4 above, we get the unfortunate 
conclusion that educated non-experts think there is more personal and institutional bias 
operative within climate science than do climate experts themselves.
20
 These data seem to 
point to a crisis of trust in the men and women who work in climate science today. 
 The mean responses of all participant groups to Question 2.10 fell significantly 
above the midpoint, with that of astrophysicists being the highest. Thus, despite the fact 
that disagreements within science can sometimes be exploited for ideological aims, 
climate scientists and climate policy experts still agree that disagreement can be good for 
the health of their field.  
 There were significant correlations between participants’ answers to Question 
2.10 and their answers to 2.2 and 2.6. The more someone agreed that two experts could 
look at the same data but reasonably arrive at different conclusions (Q2.2), the more 
likely they were to think that disagreement could be good for a scientific discipline 
(Q2.10) (r = .31, p < .000001). Participants who reported taking a conciliationist 
approach to peer disagreement (Q2.6) were also significantly more likely to think 
disagreement could be good for science (Q2.10) (r = .23, p < .000001). These three 
questions thus all seem to tap into a kind of epistemic flexibility among our participants. 
 
4.8 Public Trust in Science 
As compared to other participant groups, climate scientists and undergraduates more 
strongly agreed that publicizing disagreement among scientific experts reduces public 
                                                 
 20 We suspect that among non-experts without a college education this disparity may be even more 
pronounced. 
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trust in science (Q2.12). The two groups of non-experts in our study were asked how 
much trust they have in climate science experts (Q2.15) and how much trust they have in 
scientists working in other areas of science (Q2.16). The mean response of each group 
fell significantly and substantially above the neutral midpoint for both questions (r’s .81 
to .92—the largest effect sizes reported in this study). The confidence that each group 
expressed in climate scientists was significantly lower than the confidence they expressed 
in other scientists. There were no significant differences between the two participant 
groups. Thus, while non-experts express less confidence in climate scientists than other 
scientists, they express very high levels of confidence in both. 
 
4.9 Public Policy 
The remaining two questions from Questionnaire 2 concerned the public policy 
implications of expert disagreement. The mean responses of all participants except 
astrophysicists to Question 2.13 fell significantly below the midpoint. Thus, participants 
disagreed to a modest extent that scientists should keep out of public policy discussions. 
All participant groups (excluding astrophysicists) agreed on Question 2.14 that the 
science of climate change was settled enough for policy purposes, with climate experts 
agreeing most strongly. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The goal of our study was to shed light on the role and consequences of disagreement 
among scientific experts and its implications for policy decisions and public opinion. We 
observed that, as compared with educated non-experts, climate experts believe (i) that 
29 
29 
 
 
there is less disagreement within climate science about climate change, (ii) that more of 
the disagreement that does exist concerns public policy questions rather than the science 
itself, (iii) that methodological factors play less of a role in generating existing 
disagreement among experts about climate science, (iv) that fewer personal and 
institutional biases influence the nature and direction of climate science research, (v) that 
there is more agreement among scientists about which methods or theoretical 
perspectives should be used to examine and explain the relevant phenomena, (vi) that 
disagreements about climate change should not lead people to conclude that the scientific 
methods being employed today are unreliable or incapable of revealing the truth, and (vii) 
that climate science is more settled than ideological pundits would have us believe and 
settled enough to base public policy on it. We also observed that the uniquely American 
political context predicted participants’ judgments in many of these domains.  
 Our study also reveals that, as compared to climate scientists, astrophysicists 
working in cosmic ray physics were generally more willing to acknowledge expert 
disagreement, more open to the idea that a set of data can have multiple valid 
interpretations, and generally less quick to dismiss someone articulating a non-standard 
view as non-expert, than climate scientists. This was commensurate with the greater 
inherent uncertainty and data lacunae in their field. Experts in both climate science and 
astrophysics indicated that there is strong agreement within their fields about the 
methods, theoretical frameworks, and data that are needed to address the phenomena they 
study. 
 In line with existing studies of the opinions of climate scientists (Oreskes 2004, 
Bray & von Storch 2008, Anderegg et al. 2010, Cook et al. 2013, Stenhouse et al. 2014, 
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Cook et al. 2016) and the general public (Nisbet & Myers 2007, Leiserowitz et al. 2010, 
Leiserowitz et al. 2012, Pew 2012, Leiserowitz et al. 2015, Pew 2016, Gallup 2017), our 
findings show that despite the existence of a significant consensus on the causes of 
climate change among climate scientists, the general public continues to believe that 
climate scientists disagree over the fundamental cause of global warming. Our study goes 
beyond previous studies in examining (i) differences between expert and non-expert 
populations in regard to the factors these different groups think underlie expert 
disagreement in climate science, (ii) the attitudes of experts and non-experts toward 
normative issues of expert disagreement, and (iii) and how experts from politicized and 
depoliticized areas of science compare on various metrics. It is hoped that these results 
will inform our understanding of the nature and broader social consequences of expert 
disagreement. 
 
 
References 
Anderegg, William R. L., Prall, James W., Harold, Jacob, and Schneider, Stephen H. 
2010. “Expert Credibility in Climate Change.” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 107:12107-9. 
Ayer, A. J. 1936. Language, Truth and Logic. London: Gollancz. 
Bray, Dennis, and von Storch, Hans. 2008. “The Scientific Consensus of Climate Change 
Revisited.” Environmental Science & Policy 13: 340-50. 
Christensen, David. 2007. “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News”, 
Philosophical Review, 116: 187-217. 
31 
31 
 
 
Christensen, David. 2009. “Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of 
Controversy.” Philosophy Compass 4: 756–67. 
Cook, John, Nuccitelli, Dana, Green, Sarah A., Richardson, Mark, Winkler, Bärbel, 
Painting, Rob, Way, Robert, Jacobs, Peter, and Skuce, Andrew. 2013. 
“Quantifying the Consensus on Anthropogenic Global Warming in the Scientific 
Literature.” Environmental Research Letters 8: 024024. 
Cook, John, Oreskes, Naomi, Doran, Peter T., Anderegg, William R. L., Verheggen, 
Bart, Maibach, Ed W., Carlton, J. Stuart, Lewandowsky, Stephan, Skuce, Andrew 
G., Green, and Sarah A. 2016. “Consensus on Consensus: A Synthesis of 
Consensus Estimates on Human-Caused Global Warming.” Environmental 
Research Letters 11: 048002. 
D’Agostino, Ralph B. 1986. “Tests for the Normal Distribution.” In Ralph B. D’Agostino 
& Michael A. Stephens (eds.), Goodness-of-Fit Techniques. Marcel Dekker, Inc.: 
New York, pp. 367-419. 
Feldman, Richard. 2006. “Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement.” In Stephen 
Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures, New York: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 194-214. 
Gallup News. 2017. “Global Warming Concern at Three-Decade High in U.S.” Mar. 14, 
2017. Available at: http://news.gallup.com/poll/206030/global-warming-concern-
three-decade-high.aspx. 
Kelly, Thomas. 2005. “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.” In Tamar Gendler 
and John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology vol. 1. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 167-196. 
32 
32 
 
 
Kelly, Thomas. 2010. “Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.” In Richard 
Feldman and Ted Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, pp. 111-174. 
Leiserowitz, A., Maibach, E., and Roser-Renouf, C. 2010. Climate Change in the 
American Mind: Americans’ Global Warming Beliefs and Attitudes in January 
2010. New Haven, CT: Yale Program on Climate Change Communication. 
Leiserowitz, A., Maibach, E., Roser-Renouf, C., Feinberg, G., and Howe, P. 2012 
Climate Change in the American Mind: Americans’ Global Warming Beliefs and 
Attitudes in September 2012. New Haven, CT: Yale Program on Climate Change 
Communication. 
Leiserowitz, A., Maibach, E., Roser-Renouf, C., Feinberg, G., & Rosenthal, S. 2015. 
Climate Change in the American Mind: October, 2015. New Haven, CT: Yale 
Program on Climate Change Communication. 
Matheson, Jon. 2014. The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave MacMillan. 
Nisbet, Matthew C, and Myers, Terea. 2007. “The Polls—Trends: Twenty Years of 
Public Opinion about Global Warming.” Public Opinion Quarterly 71: 444–70. 
Oreskes, Naomi. 2004. “The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change.” Science 306: 
1686. 
Pew Research Center. 2012. “More Say There is Solid Evidence of Global Warming.” 
Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. Available at: 
http://www.people-press.org/2012/10/15/more-say-there-is-solid-evidence-of-
global-warming/. 
33 
33 
 
 
Pew Research Center. 2015. “Public and Scientists’ Views on Science and Society.” 
Available at: 
http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/01/PI_ScienceandSociety_Report_012915.
pdf.  
Pew Research Center. 2016. “The Politics of Climate.” Available at: 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/10/04/the-politics-of-climate/.  
Stenhouse, N., Maibach, E., Cobb, S., Ban, R., Bleistein, A., Croft, P., Bierly, E., Seitter, 
K., Rasmussen, G., and Leiserowitz, A. 2014. “Meteorologists’ Views About 
Global Warming: A Survey of American Meteorological Society Professional 
Members.” Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 95: 1029–40. 
Stevenson, C. L. 1944. Ethics and Language. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Divergent Perspectives on Expert Disagreement: Preliminary Evidence from 
Climate Science, Climate Policy, Astrophysics, and Public Opinion 
James R. Beebe (University at Buffalo), Maria Baghramian (University College Dublin), 
Luke Drury (Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies), Finnur Dellsén (Inland 
Norway University of Applied Sciences) 
Supplementary Materials 
 
 
Peer Disagreement 
According to the recent philosophical literature, at a rough approximation, two or 
more people are epistemic peers in a given domain of enquiry E if (1) they have 
equal knowledge, training, cognitive skills such as powers of reasoning, epistemic 
virtues such as rationality and impartiality, intelligence, and background information, 
relevant to E, (2) there is no substantial difference in their cognitive abilities and 
limitations (3) they are equally well positioned to consider the available evidence 
regarding E, and (4) they have considered the available evidence regarding E with 
equal care and attention. Epistemic peers disagree when they have opposing and 
incompatible beliefs regarding E: two people have a disagreement if one of them 
believes a certain proposition P and the second disbelieves P or believes not P. 
 In cases of peer disagreement, most contributors to the debate defend some 
version of the view that one should move closer to one’s peers’ opinion, e.g., by 
suspending judgment or by adopting an intermediate level of confidence between the 
disagreeing peer and one’s former self (e.g., Christensen 2006, Feldman 2006, Elga 
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2007). This family of views is known as conciliationism. In contrast, steadfastness holds 
that one should ‘stand one’s ground’ in the face of peer disagreement, i.e., continue to 
have the same beliefs and levels of confidence as one did before the disagreement. 
Although this is certainly a minority view in the literature, it does have its proponents 
(e.g., Kelly 2005, 2010). 
 Question 2.2 asks a general question about the possibility of reasonable and 
apparently faultless disagreement—i.e., disagreements where neither side seems to be 
making any obvious errors and disputants are equally well informed and possess the 
same evidence. It concerns the following principle that figures centrally in philosophical 
discussions of how one should respond to equally well informed peers with whom one 
disagrees: 
Uniqueness. In any given evidential situation, there is only one attitude that it is 
rational to take toward a proposition in light of the evidence one possesses. 
Cf. Christensen (2009) for an overview of how a principle like this figures in 
contemporary philosophical debates, although Christensen focuses his attention on a 
slightly stronger version of Uniqueness. 
 
Participants 
Climate scientists were recruited via messages to the following listservs: ecolog-l 
(maintained by the Ecological Society of America), coral-list (maintained by the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s Coral Reef Conservation Program and 
Atlantic Oceanographic and Meteorological Laboratory), cryolist (affiliated with the 
International Glaciological Society), arcticinfo (for arctic climate scientists), and marine-
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b (for marine biodiversity scientists). Climate policy experts were recruited via messages 
to climate-l (maintained by the International Institute for Sustainable Development), the 
primary listserv for climate policy experts. Astrophysicists were recruited via an 
invitation in a bulletin of the International Astronomical Union Division D (High Energy 
Phenomena and Fundamental Physics) and listservs for researchers affiliated or 
collaborating with scientists at the Dublin Institute for Advanced Study, the Pierre Auger 
Observatory (Argentina), and the High Energy Stereoscopic System (Namibia). 
Undergraduates were recruited via email with assistance from the UCD IT Services and 
Student Services offices. Alumni from the University at Buffalo were recruited via email 
with assistance from the UB Office of Development and Alumni Communications. 
 
 Total 
Ave. 
Age 
% 
Female 
Ave. Years 
Experience 
% with 
Doctoral 
Degree 
% with 
Master’s 
Degree only 
Climate scientists 457 43 41  17 66 26 
Climate policy 
experts 
200 48 31 18 54 38 
Undergraduates 697 23 52 n/a n/a n/a 
Alumni 1,914 52 44 n/a 28 40% 
Astrophysicists 99
1 49 17 22 91 4 
Table S1. Participant demographics. 
 
 
UK or 
Ireland 
Rest of 
Europe 
U.S. 
Rest of 
Americas 
Other 
Climate 
scientists 
6% 28% 45% 8% 13% 
Climate policy 
experts 
14% 23% 30% 10% 23% 
Astrophysicists 6% 59% 17% 9% 9% 
Table S2. Nationalities of expert participants. 
                                                 
 1 The total global community of cosmic ray physicists is only a few hundred, so this number 
represents a good proportion of the scientists in this field. 
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 Because the various experts we recruited were from several different countries 
and because we suspected that differences in judgments might fall along national lines, 
we asked experts to indicate their nationality. Because the university undergraduates we 
recruited were all attending school in Ireland and all of the university alumni attended 
school in New York, we asked them about their ethnicity rather than about their 
nationalities. The undergraduates reported that they were 83% white Irish, and the alumni 
were 82% Caucasian. 
 
Additional Analyses, Figures, and Tables 
D’Agostino-Pearson omnibus tests for normality (D’Agostino 1986) were performed on 
the distributions of each participant group’s answers to each question. The D’Agostino-
Pearson test works better for large samples than the Kolmogorov-Smirnov or Shapiro-
Wilk tests. The D’Agostino-Pearson tests, along with visual inspection of histograms and 
P-P plots, revealed that a large majority of the distributions of responses were non-
normal. The distributions of responses from climate scientists, undergraduates, and 
alumni were non-normal on every question, and approximately half of the answer 
distributions of climate policy experts and astrophysicists were non-normal. Shapiro-
Wilk tests for normality, which are better suited for smaller sample sizes, were also 
performed of the distributions of responses from climate policy experts and 
astrophysicists. These tests indicated that the relevant answer distributions were non-
normal. Logarithmic and square root transformations of the data failed to result in normal 
distributions. Therefore, with only a few exceptions, non-parametric tests were used in 
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the analyses below when comparing the answers of different groups to the same question 
or the answers of members of the same group to different questions. Parametric one-
sample t-tests were used above to test whether the mean response of each of the five 
participant groups to particular items differed from the neutral midpoint because there is 
not a good non-parametric equivalent and because it is the normality of sampling 
distributions rather than of sample data that is most central to the validity of the t-test. 
 Kruskal-Wallis tests were used on each question to examine overall between-
group differences. Pairwise differences were then examined with post-hoc Mann-
Whitney tests, and Benjamini-Hochberg corrections were used in each case to control for 
multiple comparisons. 
 The mean responses of the five participant groups to each of the items in 
Questionnaires 1 and 2 are summarized below in Tables S3 and S4. For ease of reference, 
the rightmost column indicates the midpoint of the response scale for each item. One-
sample t-tests were run on the set of responses represented by each cell, in order to see 
whether they differed significantly from the relevant midpoint. All statistical tests 
reported in this paper are two-tailed. To correct for multiple comparisons, initial p values 
were adjusted using the Benjamini-Hochberg method. Mean responses whose adjusted p 
values were less than .05 are marked with a ‘*’, those that were less than .01 are marked 
with a ‘**’, and those below .001 are marked with a ‘***’. 
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Table S3. Mean responses of the five participant groups to each of the items in Questionnaire 1, along with standard 
deviations, a measure of effect size, and an additional column indicating the midpoint of the relevant response scale. R 
values represent the size of the mean’s difference from the neutral midpoint. 
  
Question 
Climate scientists Climate policy 
experts 
Undergraduates Alumni Astrophysicists 
Midpoint 
 M SD r M SD r M SD r M SD r M SD r  
Q1.1 1.2*** 0.8 .39 1.4 0.8 n/a 1.7*** 0.8 .27 1.6*** 0.8 .12 2.0*** 0.5 .69 1.5 
Q1.2 2.3** 1.3 .22 2.4** 1.2 .33 3.0*** 1.1 .70 3.0*** 1.1 .68 1.8 1.3 n/a 2 
Q1.3 2.6*** 1.2 .47 2.9*** 1.0 .69 2.9*** 1.0 .65 3.0*** 1.0 .72 2.9*** 1.0 .69 2 
Q1.4 2.6*** 1.2 .43 2.3* 1.2 .26 3.0*** 1.0 .72 3.0*** 1.0 .71 2.5** 1.0 .42 2 
Q1.5 2.0 1.3 n/a 2.0 1.2 n/a 2.4*** 1.2 .31 2.5*** 1.2 .38 2.0 1.3 n/a 2 
Q1.6 2.4*** 1.2 .30 2.4*** 1.1 .37 2.1* 1.2 .12 2.6*** 1.2 .43 2.9*** 1.1 .64 2 
Q1.7 2.3** 1.3 .20 2.7*** 1.1 .52 2.3*** 1.2 .24 2.3*** 1.3 .25 2.6*** 1.0 .53 2 
Q1.8 2.1 1.4 n/a 2.3 1.2 n/a 2.3*** 1.3 .20 2.2*** 1.4 .14 3.0*** 0.9 .76 2 
Q1.9 2.5*** 1.5 .29 2.7*** 1.4 .45 3.1*** 1.2 .66 3.3*** 1.1 .76 0.9*** 1.2 .66 2 
Q1.10 2.1 1.5 n/a 2.0 1.5 n/a 3.2*** 1.1 .73 3.2*** 1.2 .71 1.2*** 1.4 .52 2 
Q1.11 1.9 1.3 n/a 2.2 1.3 n/a 2.6*** 1.2 .45 2.6*** 1.3 .42 2.3 1.1 n/a 2 
Q1.12 1.7*** 1.2 .25 1.7 1.3 n/a 1.8** 1.3 .14 2.0 1.3 n/a 1.9 1.2 n/a 2 
Q1.13 1.7** 1.3 .23 1.5** 1.3 .35 2.0 1.4 n/a 2.1 1.3 n/a 1.4** 1.2 .48 2 
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Table S4. Mean responses of the five participant groups to each of the items in Questionnaire 2, along with standard 
deviations, a measure of effect size, and an additional column indicating the midpoint of the relevant response scale. R 
values represent the size of the mean’s difference from the neutral midpoint. 
 
Question 
Climate scientists Climate policy 
experts 
Undergraduates Alumni Astrophysicists 
Midpoint 
 M SD r M SD r M SD r M SD r M SD r  
Q2.1 1.0*** 0.8 .52 1.5 0.8 n/a 1.8*** 0.8 .30 1.6** 0.8 .11 2.0*** 0.6 .63 1.5 
Q2.2 3.6*** 1.9 .24 4.1 1.9 n/a 4.6*** 1.7 .32 4.6*** 1.8 .33 4.8*** 1.5 .45 4 
Q2.3 3.1*** 1.8 .46 3.5** 1.9 .27 4.0 1.8 n/a 4.0 1.9 n/a 4.8** 1.7 .40 4 
Q2.4 2.3*** 1.6 .74 2.7*** 1.8 .58 2.9*** 1.8 .52 3.2*** 2.0 .36 4.3 1.8 n/a 4 
Q2.5 3.3*** 1.9 .35 3.7 2.0 n/a 4.6*** 1.8 .34 4.2** 1.9 .10 4.1 1.9 n/a 4 
Q2.6 3.6*** 1.6 .27 3.2*** 1.7 .43 3.5*** 1.7 .27 2.9*** 1.6 .57 4.5* 1.5 .33 4 
Q2.7 5.0*** 1.5 .56 5.0*** 1.6 .53 4.7*** 1.6 .41 4.8*** 1.7 .45 4.1 1.6 n/a 4 
Q2.8 3.1*** 1.7 .46 3.7 1.6 n/a 4.4*** 1.6 .21 3.8** 1.8 .10 4.0 1.6 n/a 4 
Q2.9 2.7*** 1.7 .63 3.4** 1.9 .30 4.2 1.8 n/a 3.8*** 1.8 .12 3.2*** 1.6 .44 4 
Q2.10 4.5*** 1.8 .25 4.5** 1.9 .27 4.4*** 1.9 .20 4.8*** 1.8 .42 5.5*** 1.5 .70 4 
Q2.11 5.1*** 1.5 .59 5.2*** 1.8 .57 4.8*** 1.5 .48 4.8*** 1.6 .43 n/a n/a n/a 4 
Q2.12 4.6*** 1.9 .31 4.2 1.9 n/a 4.8*** 1.8 .39 4.1 1.8 n/a 3.6 1.7 n/a 4 
Q2.13 3.6** 2.0 .19 3.1*** 1.9 .45 3.4*** 1.8 .31 3.6*** 2.0 .20 3.7 1.9 n/a 4 
Q2.14 6.0*** 1.7 .76 5.8*** 1.7 .74 5.2*** 1.6 .60 4.8*** 2.1 .38 n/a n/a n/a 4 
Q2.15 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 2.6*** 0.6 .88 2.5*** 0.7 .81 n/a n/a n/a 1.5 
Q2.16 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 2.7*** 0.5 .92 2.7*** 0.5 .92 n/a n/a n/a 1.5 
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Question df H P 
Q1.1 4 83.537 < .000001 
Q1.2 4 99.78 < .000001 
Q1.3 4 27.14 < .0001 
Q1.4 4 61.76 < .000001 
Q1.5 4 40.56 < .000001 
Q1.6 4 40.09 < .000001 
Q1.7 4 8.77 .067 
Q1.8 4 16.83 < .01 
Q1.9 4 146.64 < .000001 
Q1.10 4 207.4 < .000001 
Q1.11 4 54.89 < .000001 
Q1.12 4 14.64 < .01 
Q1.13 4 34.51 < .000001 
Table S5. Results of Kruskal-Wallis tests for participants’ responses to 
Questionnaire 1. 
 
Question df H P 
Q2.1 4 130.64 < .000001 
Q2.2 4 65.71 < .000001 
Q2.3 4 72.42 < .000001 
Q2.4 4 79.25 < .000001 
Q2.5 4 72.81 < .000001 
Q2.6 4 92.08 < .000001 
Q2.7 4 18.95 < .01 
Q2.8 4 72.97 < .000001 
Q2.9 4 110.68 < .000001 
Q2.10 4 30.64 < .0001 
Q2.11 3 19.73 < .001 
Q2.12 4 55.14 < .000001 
Q2.13 4 9.31 .054 
Q2.14 3 112.28 < .000001 
Table S6. Results of Kruskal-Wallis tests for participants’ responses to 
Questionnaire 2. 
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 As compared to educated non-experts, climate experts more strongly agreed on 
Question 2.11 that disagreement within climate science concerned the public policy 
recommendations that should be made in light of the science rather than the science itself. 
However, the differences were not as large as the results from Questions 1.1 and 2.1 led 
us to expect. Each pairwise comparison between one expert group and one non-expert 
group was significant, but the effect sizes were small (r’s between .09 and .14). 
 On Questions 1.2 through 1.8 about epistemic factors that contribute to expert 
disagreement, post-hoc Mann-Whitney comparisons revealed that the two groups of non-
experts differed only on Questions 1.3 (r = .07, a statistically significant but theoretically 
negligible effect size) and 1.6 (r = .16). Pairwise comparisons also indicated that 
scientists differed significantly from undergraduates on all questions (r’s from .11 to .27), 
except 1.6, and from alumni on all questions (r’s from .15 to .20), except 1.6 and 1.8. The 
answers of climate policy experts differed significantly from undergraduates on all 
questions (r’s from .11 to .23), except 1.3 and 1.8, and from alumni on all questions (r’s 
from .12 to .17), except 1.3, 1.6, and 1.8. 
 Post hoc pairwise comparisons on Questions 1.9 through 1.13, which concerned 
nonepistemic factors that give rise to expert disagreement, revealed that the responses of 
climate scientists differed significantly from those of undergraduates on all questions (r’s 
.12 to .38), except 1.12, which was about careerism. Climate scientists differed 
significantly from alumni on all questions (r’s .09 to .30). The responses of climate 
policy experts differed significantly from those of both groups non-experts on all 
questions, except Question 1.12 (r’s .11 to .34). The responses of undergraduates and 
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alumni to Questions 1.9 through 1.13 differed significantly on the role of political 
ideology (r = .08), but this theoretically negligible effect size achieved significance only 
because 1,290 participants were being compared in the analysis. The answers of 
undergraduates and alumni did not differ significantly on any of the other nonepistemic 
factors. Astrophysicists’ responses did not differ significantly from any group on 
Questions 1.11 and 1.12. On Question 1.13, astrophysicists did not differ significantly 
from climate scientists and climate policy experts but did differ from undergraduates (r = 
.15) and alumni (r = .11) to a small extent. Undergraduates and alumni gave higher 
ratings to the importance of defending theories that represent one’s life’s work (Q1.11) 
than the three groups of experts. 
 The mean composite epistemic score of each participant group fell significantly 
above the midpoint (r’s .39 to .68). However, the mean composite nonepistemic scores of 
climate scientists and climate policy experts failed to differ from the midpoint, while 
those of undergraduates (r = .51) and alumni (r = .58) fell significantly above the 
midpoint, and those of astrophysicists (r = .45) fell significantly below. 
 
 Mean Composite 
Epistemic Score 
Mean Composite 
Nonepistemic Score 
American 
Non-
American 
American 
Non-
American 
Climate 
Expertise 
Expert 2.3 2.4 2.1 2.0 
Non-Expert 2.7 2.6 2.6 2.5 
Table S7. Mean composite scores, grouped by epistemic vs. nonepistemic, 
expert vs. non-expert, and American vs. non-American. 
 
 A two-way (climate expert/non-expert x American/non-American) ANOVA 
performed on participants’ responses to Question 2.2 (excluding astrophysicists) failed to 
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be deliver a result of significance. A similar analysis performed on Question 2.6 revealed 
that American climate experts, non-American climate experts, and non-American non-
experts all had identical mean scores (3.5), whereas American non-experts had a 
significantly lower mean score (2.9). This difference resulted in there being significant 
main effects for expertise and being American, and a significant interaction between the 
two. (Expertise: F(1, 1641) = 7.76, p < .01. Being American: F(1, 1641) = 8.94, p < .01. 
Expertise * being American: F(1, 1641) = 9.51, p < .01.) On Question 2.7, a two-way 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for expertise and a nearly significant effect 
for being an American. (Expertise: F(1, 1640) = 4.53, p = .033. Being American: F(1, 
1640) = 3.54, p = .06.) 
 The mean response of astrophysicists to Question 2.4 fell near the midpoint. In 
response to Question 2.5, the mean responses of undergraduates (r = .34) and alumni (r = 
.10) fell significantly above the midpoint, while that of climate scientists fell significantly 
above (r = .35). 
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Figure S1. Mean responses to Questions 2.2, 2.6, and 2.7, organized by 
participant group. 
 
 
Figure S3. Mean responses to Questions 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5, organized by 
participant group.  
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Figure S4. Mean responses to Questions 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10, organized by 
participant group.  
 
 We averaged participants’ responses to Questions 2.8 and 2.9 to obtain an 
institutional bias score. We then combined all participants who were asked about climate 
science and sorting them by whether or not they were climate experts or American. A 
two-way ANOVA revealed significant main effects for being an expert and being an 
American, but the latter effect was in the opposite direction than what we had predicted. 
(Expertise: F(1, 1642) = 92.186, p < .0001. Being American: F(1, 1642) = 16.71, p < 
.000001.) Among both climate experts and educated non-experts, Americans were less 
likely to judge there was institutional bias against controversial hypotheses or minority 
views than non-Americans.  
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Figure S2. Mean institutional bias scores for all participants except 
astrophysicists, organized by whether or not participants are climate 
experts or American. 
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Figure S5. Mean participant responses to Question 2.12, organized by 
participant group. 
 
 On Question 2.14, the differences between the answers of the two groups of 
climate experts differed significantly from the answers of each of our groups of non-
experts (r’s .17 to .30). 
 For Questions 2.15 and 2.16, Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were used to test for 
between-question differences, and Mann-Whitney tests were used to test for between-
group differences. Both undergraduates (r = -.22) and alumni (r = -.29) showed 
significant between-question differences (Undergraduates: z = -4.04, p < .0001. Alumni: z 
= -9.01, p < .00001). The Benjamini-Hochberg method was used to correct for multiple 
comparisons.  
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Disagreement in Cosmic Ray Physics 
The questions we asked about cosmic ray physics concerned the science as a whole and 
did not introduce finer distinctions between specific topics or areas of disagreement. 
Because this area of research is likely to be unfamiliar to many readers it may be useful 
to give a brief overview. The surprising existence of a highly penetrating ionising 
radiation reaching the Earth from outer space was discovered over one hundred years 
ago, but many features of these “cosmic rays” are still poorly understood. 
 Observationally the main issue in cosmic ray physics is that the flux of particles 
falls off extremely rapidly as one goes to higher particle energies so that no one 
experiment works over more than a small part of the energy range that needs to be 
covered. The flux of mildly relativistic particles above the atmosphere is about one per 
square centimetre per second so that quite small satellite experiments can be used, 
whereas at the very highest energies we see only about one particle per square kilometre 
per century requiring large experiments such as the Pierre Auger Observatory, which 
covers an area in Argentina roughly the size of Luxembourg (of course with sparse 
sampling). 
 Furthermore, while at low energies we can relatively easily identify the particles 
(they turn put to be mainly atomic nuclei), at the higher energies we have to use very 
indirect techniques. Combining the results from these many different techniques and 
experiments is complicated, and this is one major source of disagreement in the field. 
There is room for disagreement about the fundamental observational facts themselves, 
even before theoretical interpretation. And once one moves away from the basic 
observations into interpretation, then further uncertainties are introduced. Relating the 
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observed fluxes of particles to their putative production spectra in sources requires a 
model for their propagation through the intervening magnetic fields, radiation fields and 
matter distributions, many of which are poorly known.  
 Of course some facts are indisputable. That the particles exist is certain. The 
broad features of the all-particle energy spectrum (where one simply lumps all the 
particles together and just measures their energy) are by now well established except at 
the very highest energies. The total power requirements are fairly clear. But the 
composition at the higher energies is quite uncertain, the origin of some fine structure 
that has recently been seem in precision measurements at lower energies is unclear, there 
is a long-standing tension between the source spectra favoured by propagation theory and 
acceleration theory, we do not have a satisfactory propagation model that fits all the data 
(especially the anisotropy in arrival directions) etc. As in most areas of science one has a 
mixture of some well-established facts, but a lot of uncertainty in the detail and especially 
in the interpretation. The challenge is to synthesise a coherent scheme that is also 
consistent with the rest of astrophysics and physics. Depending on the relative weight one 
attaches to different pieces of evidence and theoretical preferences, it is possible to have 
legitimate peer disagreement on many aspects while still agreeing on certain basics. 
